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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment exists in the world of probabilities. When the framers 
prohibited “unreasonable searches and seizures,”1 they opened the door to mod-
ern-day “reasonable suspicion analysis,” which “is not concerned with ‘hard cer-
tainties, but with probabilities[.]’”2 Thus, while Terry v. Ohio radically shifted the 
focus of the reasonableness inquiry from the warrant process to the warrantless 
world of “stop and frisk,”3 in many ways the case merely reaffirmed the informed 
speculation and educated guesswork central to police investigations. 
But the goalposts for reasonableness in Terry analyses appear to be changing 
with respect to investigating firearms violations. Courts and officers once could as-
sume that a concealed-gun possessor probably was in violation of a state firearms 
statute because most states tightly restricted or outright prohibited the public con-
cealed carry of firearms.4 But today, all fifty states allow the open and concealed 
                                                                
  Professor of Legal Writing, University of San Diego School of Law (20172018); Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, Campbell University School of Law (20182019); J.D. 2007, Boston University School of Law; 
B.A. 2003 in Political Science, Yale University. I would like to thank Noël Harlow for her support throughout 
this process, and the editors of the Idaho Law Review for their patience and flexibility in working with me 
to make my participation in this symposium a success. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 2. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
 3. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 262 (6th ed., 2013) 
(“Terry provided the impetus, as well as the framework, for a move by the Supreme Court away from the 
proposition that ‘warrantless searches are per se unreasonable,’ to the competing view that the appropriate 
test of police conduct ‘is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search 
was reasonable.’”) (citations omitted). 
 4. Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (observing that, 
when states largely prohibited public possession of firearms, “[j]udges[] (and officers[]) . . . rested on [the] 
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carry of firearms in public,5 and forty-two of these states place little or no re-
strictions on who can do so.6 This changing landscape alters not only the probabil-
istic calculus of who may be stopped under suspicion of committing a crime but also 
the calculus of who may be frisked under suspicion of posing a danger to the officer 
and the public. 
Courts considering these questions have struggled to consistently articulate 
what constitutes “reasonable suspicion” in these circumstances. Some maintain 
that public gun possession still provides a good indicator that criminal activity may 
be afoot,7 while others conclude that authorizing stops based solely on facially law-
ful activity would “eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed in-
dividuals[.]”8 Even when courts concede that a Terry stop of an armed individual 
was initiated lawfully, they disagree on what constitutes reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a protective frisk. Some argue that an armed individual poses a per se dan-
ger and may be searched,9 while others claim additional indicia of dangerousness 
beyond the mere possession of a gun is required.10 The Supreme Court recently de-
clined an invitation to clarify the issue, leaving confusion and conflict among the 
lower courts.11 
In considering how to assess this changing probability calculus, this short Essay 
asks whether tort law probability principles can play a role in clarifying a justifiable 
reasonableness standard in the age of concealed carry. With reference to the iconic 
Hand Formula,12 this Essay suggests a thought experiment: if one considered a Terry 
stop and a Terry protective frisk as two types of “precautions” (B) designed to pre-
vent crime and injury, respectively, what amount of risk (P) and magnitude (L) of 
                                                                
generally unstated empirical assumption that there was a significant likelihood that such a person was car-
rying the gun unlawfully.”). 
 5. See Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR., http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-ar-
eas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/ (last visited May 6, 2018) (“Every state—as well as the District of Co-
lumbia—allows the carrying of concealed weapons in some form.”). 
 6. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 441 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 7. See, e.g., Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1304 (upholding custodial stop and frisk based solely on individ-
ual’s admission he possessed a gun); State in Interest of H.B., 381 A.2d 759, 769 (N.J. 1977) (Handler, J., 
dissenting) (finding that an anonymous phone tip giving a “general description and location of a ‘man with 
a gun’” constituted reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the suspected individual). 
 8. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 708 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Harris, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]hen a state elects to legalize the public carry of firearms, . . . the Fourth Amendment equation changes, 
and public possession of a gun is no longer ‘suspicious’ in a way that would authorize a Terry stop.”). 
 9. See id. at 700 (upholding frisk of armed individual because “the officer reasonably believed 
that the person stopped ‘was armed and thus’ dangerous.”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 
112 (1977)); United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an officer 
reasonably suspected the stopped individual was dangerous because he was armed). 
 10. See, e.g., Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t., 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(“Clearly established law require[s officers] to point to evidence” that suspects are both “armed and dan-
gerous.”). 
 11. Robinson v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017) (denying certiorari). 
 12. See Robert Steinbuch, The Executive-Internalization Approach to High-Risk Corporate Behav-
ior: Establishing Individual Criminal Liability for the Intentional or Reckless Introduction of Excessively Dan-
gerous Products or Services into the Stream of Commerce, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y. 321, 346 (2007) 
(explaining that the “oft-quoted Learned Hand formula,” “set forth in the iconic decision[] United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co.[,]” formed the foundation for modern tort “risk-utility test[s]” in products liability and 
other areas involving inherently dangerous instruments). 
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harm would be required to justify these precautions? In particular, what “specific 
and articulable facts” beyond mere gun possession are necessary in this new con-
cealed carry age to demonstrate a sufficient risk of criminal activity to justify a stop? 
And once stopped, what renders an armed individual a sufficient risk to justify a 
protective search for weapons? 
While this Essay suggests tentative answers to the above questions, they by 
no means are intended to conclusively resolve what has become an increasingly 
thorny issue in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather, they are intended to 
serve as starting points for a broader discussion about the role of private tort prin-
ciples in defining constitutional restraints, of stop and frisk practices in an increas-
ingly armed civil society, and of Terry’s continued relevance in assessing the next 
fifty years of police-civilian encounters. 
II. TERRY STOPS AND FIREARMS: OLD ASSUMPTIONS 
Prior to 1968, a presumption existed that the only lawful encounters between 
civilians and police officers under the Fourth Amendment were either voluntary en-
counters, or searches, seizures, or arrests based upon probable cause.13 The Warren 
Court shattered that presumption in Terry, in which the Court held for the first time 
that lawful police encounters do exist “which do[] not depend solely upon the vol-
untary cooperation of the citizen and yet which stop[] short of an arrest based on 
probable cause . . . .”14 In greatly expanding the permissible scope of law enforce-
ment’s investigative powers, the Court found that a police officer can seize a person 
and subject her to a limited search for weapons, so long as the officer has a “rea-
sonable suspicion” that the individual is presently or imminently engaged in crimi-
nal activity and is armed and dangerous.15 
 Although often overlooked, Terry authorizes two distinct actions, a 
“stop” and a “frisk,” each controlled by a separate test. Police can stop 
persons who appear to be engaged in crime. They can frisk [those persons 
after a lawful stop] if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the person 
“is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.”16  
In other words, “[t]he stop and the search are analyzed as two separate 
events, with each requiring its own justification.”17 For example, if an officer law-
fully stops someone because she reasonably suspects criminal activity, she cannot 
                                                                
 13. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, at 263. 
 14. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968).  
 15. Id. at 30 (“We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, . . . he is entitled for the protec-
tion of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.”).  
 16. Bellin, supra note 4, at 30 (emphasis added). 
 17. Matthew J. Wilkins, Armed and Not Dangerous? A Mistaken Treatment of Firearms in Terry 
Analyses, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2017); Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326–27 (2009) (“First, the in-
vestigatory stop must be lawful. That requirement is met in an on-the-street encounter, Terry determined, 
when the police officer reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed 
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automatically frisk the individual without a separate finding that the individual is 
armed and dangerous. Conversely, an officer cannot lawfully stop someone solely 
because the individual is armed without independent reasonable suspicion that the 
individual is engaged in criminal activity.18 
Despite the need to point to “specific and articulable facts” indicative of crim-
inal activity to justify a stop and search, officers after Terry regularly stopped and 
frisked individuals in public based on one fact: the suspected presence of a fire-
arm.19 Courts regularly upheld with little fanfare stops and subsequent searches 
based solely on reasonable suspicion of gun possession.20 Courts assumed that an 
officer could reasonably suspect, at a minimum, that the individual was in the act 
of committing a weapons possession offense because for most of the half-century 
since Terry states either tightly constricted or outright prohibited the public carrying 
of firearms.21 Even in states with more lenient public possession laws, the relative 
infrequency of open and concealed carry permitting22 and scarcity of guns in public 
in general,23 all might reasonably have given rise to a suspicion of some type of 
criminal mischief. 
For decades, that reasonableness was virtually assumed when the suspect 
possessed a firearm, because of two increasingly unreliable assumptions made by 
officers and courts.  First, there was a widely held “assumption that a person carry-
                                                                
a criminal offense. Second, to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that 
the person stopped is armed and dangerous.”). 
 18. See United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an officer may 
not conduct a protective search to allay a reasonable fear that a suspect is armed without first having a 
reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop); Terry, 392 U.S. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“If 
the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first 
have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. . . . [T]he person addressed . 
. . certainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner’s protection.”); United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 
1000–01 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding protective frisk violated the Fourth Amendment because officers had no 
reasonable suspicion that the individual was engaged in criminal activity). 
 19. Bellin, supra note 4, at 14–15, 31.  
 20. See United States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d 159, 160 (4th Cir. 1977) (“If the detective was justified 
in questioning Gorin, he also was justified in seizing the gun that he could see even before ‘patting down’ 
the defendant.”). 
 21. In 1988, nine states were “shall issue” jurisdictions. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75(a)(1)a (2018); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 29-28(a) (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN § 790.06(2) (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
47-2-3 (West 2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2003(1) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-04-03(1) (West 
2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-7 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.070 (West 2018). Vermont was the 
lone “unrestricted” jurisdiction allowing concealed carry without a permit. Charles C. W. Cooke, Vermont: 
Safe and Happy and Armed to the Teeth, NAT’L REV. (June 24, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/cor-
ner/396857 (noting that “constitutional carry” is sometimes referred to as “Vermont carry” because Ver-
mont for decades was the only state in the country that did not require a permit to carry a concealed firearm 
in public). 
 22. See, e.g., Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed 
Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 683 (1995) (observing that, despite California law authorizing 
the issuance of concealed carry handgun permits, “[f]rom 1984 to 1992, . . . the City of Los Angeles police 
administration refused to issue any permits. In a city of over three million people, not one person was found 
needful of a handgun permit.”). 
 23. Philip Bump, The Number of People in America vs. the Number of Guns in America, Visualized, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/04/the-number-
of-americans-vs-the-number-of-guns-in-america-visualized-through-history/?utm_term=.1ee21d5f80d5. 
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ing a concealed weapon was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons posses-
sion[,]” thus justifying a stop under the first Terry prong.24 Second, there was once 
“nearly unanimous agreement that to be armed was dangerous,”25 giving officers 
the automatic right to frisk armed individuals based on this “blanket assumption of 
dangerousness[.]”26 
But in an increasingly permissive concealed-carry world, each of these reason-
ableness assumptions requires reconsideration. As recently as 1988, forty states ei-
ther prohibited the public possession of firearms (sixteen “no issue” jurisdictions) 
or tightly regulated such possession (twenty-four “may issue” jurisdictions).27 But 
over the next thirty years, states across the country began relaxing their public con-
cealed and open carry laws.28 As of 2015, all fifty states allow the public concealed 
carry of firearms.29 Moreover, forty-two states now impose little or no restrictions 
on concealed carry authorization, meaning that a full 84% of jurisdictions in the 
country have either no or very limited restrictions on an individual’s ability to law-
fully carry a firearm in public.30 
For these states, reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop can no longer be 
justified solely on the ground that the individual carries a gun. While officers once 
assumed that the presence of a concealed weapon indicated that criminal activity 
may be afoot, “increasingly permissive gun-possession laws erode the assumption 
that public handgun possession is unlawful.”31 “[A]s public possession and display 
of firearms become lawful under more circumstances, Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence and police practices must adapt.”32 
Given this changing landscape, courts should require more from officers than 
simple reliance on the (suspected) presence of a firearm. At least some other “ar-
ticulable fact” that a crime is occurring should be present to justify a stop under 
Terry.33 This accords with Terry’s probabilistic purpose that there be some reason 
                                                                
 24. Bellin, supra note 4, at 31. 
 25. Wilkins, supra note 17, at 1170. 
 26. Id. (quoting Bellin, supra note 4). 
 27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 28. Cramer & Kopel, supra note 22, at 685 (“Since 1987, states have increasingly adopted a new 
breed of concealed handgun permit laws that make easier the process for many adults to get a permit to 
carry a concealed handgun.”). 
 29. GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 5. 
 30. See id. (summarizing state concealed carry laws by state); Concealed Carry: Right-to-Carry, 
NRA-ILA, https://www.nraila.org/get-the-facts/right-to-carry-and-concealed-carry/ (last visited May 6, 
2018) (“There are 42 [right to carry] states, . . . Forty of these states have ‘shall issue’ laws, requiring that 
concealed carry permits be issued to qualified applicants [without discretion].”); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 
426, 443 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (In addition to these forty state statues, Alabama and 
Connecticut “by statute allow considerable police discretion but, in practice, commonly issue permits to 
applicants who meet the same standards as in shall-issue states”) (quoting NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., 
FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 21 (2012)). 
 31. Bellin, supra note 4, at 25 (“Consequently, the Fourth Amendment authority flowing from 
that assumption must be reevaluated.”). 
 32. United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 691 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 33. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993) (To allow stops of all armed per-
sons in a permissive concealed carry jurisdiction “would effectively eliminate Fourth Amendment protec-
tions for lawfully armed persons”). 
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to suspect criminal activity. Without some other indicia of criminality, the mere ob-
servation or suspicion of a citizen engaging in a lawful activity—concealed firearms 
possession—provides no information regarding the risk (P) of criminal activity. With 
an unknown (or zero) value for risk, no precautionary stop can be justified, even 
when the presence of firearms is suspected. “Where it is lawful to possess a firearm, 
unlawful possession ‘is not the default status.’ There is no ‘automatic firearm ex-
ception’ to the Terry rule.”34 
III. TERRY FRISKS AND FIREARMS: A RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH TO AUTOMATIC 
SEARCHES 
The increasing permissiveness of public firearm possession by state and local 
governments has eroded the assumption that an officer can lawfully stop an indi-
vidual solely because he is carrying a gun in public.35 But assuming a lawful Terry 
stop has been initiated, what hurdle of reasonable suspicion must the officer clear 
before initiating a frisk? 
Over the last decade, courts have split over the issue whether an armed indi-
vidual is automatically dangerous, or if an officer must show both that the individual 
is armed and also dangerous. For example, in United States v. Robinson, the Fourth 
Circuit held that any individual who the police suspect possesses a firearm becomes 
a dangerous individual per se for Terry purposes.36 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, in 
more limited discussions, similarly found that police had an automatic right to as-
sume that an armed individual was necessarily dangerous.37 In contrast, in Northrup 
v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, the Sixth Circuit held that “[c]learly established law 
require[s officers] to point to evidence” that suspects are both “armed and danger-
ous.”38 
This Essay suggests that both sides of the debate miss the mark. By focusing 
on overly formalistic interpretations of precedent, neither side has fully reckoned 
with the practical realities attendant in these law enforcement encounters. Courts 
favoring the per se dangerous individual approach ignore empirical data suggesting 
that the vast majority of public gun carriers are not only law-abiding but pose sig-
nificantly less threat to officers and the public than the average citizen. In contrast, 
courts requiring a separate finding that the individual is both armed and dangerous 
                                                                
 34. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) (first quoting 
United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (2013), and then quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)); 
see also United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2000) (comparing an officer’s stop of an armed 
individual in a concealed carry state based on a suspicion that possession might have been illegal as to a 
stop of an individual because he “possessed a wallet, a perfectly legal act”). 
 35. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1131–33 (Where the state legislature “has decided its citizens may be 
entrusted with firearms on public streets[,]” the police have “no authority to disregard this decision” by 
subjecting law-abiding citizens to Terry stops based on nothing more than suspicion of gun possession). 
 36. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
officer reasonably believed that the person stopped ‘was armed and thus’ dangerous.”) (quoting Pennsyl-
vania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977)); cf. Robinson, 846 F.3d at 709 (Harris, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that “armed” and “dangerous” are two separate prongs of a conjunctive test). 
 37. United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Rodriguez, 739 
F.3d 481, 489 (10th Cir. 2013) (upholding frisk justified on nothing more than the presence of a firearm). 
 38. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1132 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968)). 
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ignore the inherent dangerousness to the officer and the public by the firearm itself, 
regardless of the intentions of the individual in possession. 
This Essay also offers a tentative framework to break the impasse: The Hand 
Formula. With reference to fundamental risk assessment tort principles, officers 
and courts can justify automatic protective frisks in the presence of firearms that 
both accords with the presumptive law-abidingness of concealed carry permit hold-
ers and the immensely destructive capacities of guns. 
A. The Law-Abiding Gun-Carrier 
The Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have concluded that a lawfully stopped, 
armed individual is dangerous per se and may be frisked and disarmed for the of-
ficer’s protection.39 But critics of this approach scoff at any suggestion that an 
armed individual in a concealed carry state is automatically dangerous, claiming 
that “there is general consensus that licensed gun possessors rarely use their fire-
arms to commit violent street crimes such as robberies or murders.”40 Pointing to 
“the empirical data on the relative rarity of crimes committed by licensed gun car-
riers[,]”41 these critics contend that officers should not automatically determine 
that someone armed poses a danger to them or others because data about licensed 
gun carriers suggests the opposite.42 Studies suggest that licensed gun possessors 
commit far fewer violent crimes than the citizenry at large, and that evidence com-
bined with the heightened background check requirements necessary to procure a 
concealed carry permit ought to provide licensed gun carriers with an enhanced 
presumption of law-abidingness.43 By this logic, officers cannot justifiably frisk (and 
possibly disarm) a lawful gun possessor without independent indicia of dangerous-
ness because the risk (P) that the officer or nearby public will be harmed is belied 
by the data.44 
                                                                
 39. See supra notes 35–36. 
 40. Bellin, supra note 4, at 32. 
 41. Id. at 32–33 (emphasis omitted) (“Statistics published by the State of Texas reflect that peo-
ple with concealed handgun licenses (CHL) commit only a small fraction of the street crime associated with 
public weapons possession. For example, of the roughly 4,000 people convicted for robbery or aggravated 
robbery in Texas in 2011, only two possessed a CHL. The same 2011 Texas data shows that CHL carriers 
included four (of over 500) convicted murderers, three (of 112) people convicted of manslaughter, and 
three (of 2,765 people convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.” (footnote omitted)).  
 42. Id.   
 43. BK, Reconciling Stop and Frisk with Conceal-Carry Laws, CRIM. JUST. PROGRAM DUQUESNE U. SCH. 
L. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.duqlawblogs.org/duqcrim/2014/04/reconciling-stop-and-frisk-with-conceal-
carry-laws/ (“As a conceal[ed]-carry permit holder . . . this signals to the officer that the individual passed a 
background check within the last 5 years which should afford the individual some presumption of law abid-
ingness.”); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 93738 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The available data about permit hold-
ers also imply that they are at fairly low risk of misusing guns, consistent with the relatively low arrest rates 
observed to date for permit holders.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Brief of the Governors of Texas, Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
South Carolina, and South Dakota as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 912, Peruta v. California, 137 
S. Ct. 1995 (2017) (No. 16-894) (citing multiple studies purporting to show that concealed carry permit hold-
ers are “more than 10 times less likely to commit a crime in Texas as compared to the general population”). 
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B. The Inherently Dangerous Firearm 
The Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court of Arizona have concluded that a lawfully 
stopped armed individual does not pose an automatic threat to the officer, and thus 
may only be searched if additional facts independent of the firearm suggest the 
suspect is dangerous.45 This rationale may accord with the conjunctive language of 
Terry and its progeny and may also reflect symmetry with recent data about the 
violent propensities of concealed carry permit holders. But by focusing on the indi-
vidual, these courts ignore the factor that makes the encounter inherently danger-
ous for the officer and the public: the firearm. It obscures the undeniable objective 
fact that a firearm is an inherently dangerous device created specifically and solely 
to inflict damage, and thus that its presence in a law enforcement encounter inher-
ently increases the risks to public and officer safety.46 
This recognition accords with common sense. A firearm’s sole function is to 
use explosive force to propel solid metal projectiles through the air at supersonic 
speeds over long distances, the sole purpose of which is to instantly damage, de-
stroy, wound, or kill whatever or whoever is struck by the projectile.47 Its sole pur-
pose is to inflict damage with great efficiency and force.48 Gun safety courses re-
quire gun owners to know and understand that firearms are inherently dangerous,49 
                                                                
 45. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 2015); State v. Serna, 
331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014) (“We . . . disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that mere knowledge 
or suspicion that a person is carrying a firearm satisfies the second prong of Terry, which itself involves a 
dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect be ‘armed and presently dangerous.’”) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
 46. McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986) (“[A] gun is an article that is typically and 
characteristically dangerous; the use for which it is manufactured and sold is a dangerous one, and the law 
reasonably may presume that such an article is always dangerous.”); Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 
447 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing “the substantial risk of danger and the inherently violent nature of fire-
arms”) (quoting Parsons v. Pitzer, 149 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Copening, 506 F.3d 
1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007) (characterizing a “loaded gun [as] by any measure an inherently dangerous 
weapon”); Love v. Tippy, 133 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 1998) (recognizing “the inherently violent nature of 
firearms, and the danger firearms pose to all members of society”); United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 40 
(2d Cir. 1997) (“[F]irearms are inherently dangerous devices.”). 
 47. Fundamentals of Naval Weapons Systems: Weapon Propulsion and Architecture, U.S. NAVAL 
ACAD.: WEAPONS & SYS. ENGINEERING DEP’T, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/fun/part16.htm (last vis-
ited May 6, 2018) (explaining bullet projectile propulsion process); Chris Woodford, Bullets and Missiles, 
EXPLAIN THAT STUFF!, http://www.explainthatstuff.com/bullets.html (last updated June 11, 2017). 
 48. All firearms safety advocates and courses begin with the four fundamental rules of firearms 
safety. The second rule—“Never Point The Gun At Something You Are Not Prepared To Destroy!”—under-
scores the purpose and danger of all firearms. The 4 Laws of Gun Safety, GUNLINK BLOG (Jan. 15, 2012), 
http://blog.gunlink.info/2012/01/15/the-4-laws-of-gun-safety/; Firearms Safety, EVERY CITIZEN A SOLDIER, 
http://www.everycitizenasoldier.org/firearm-safety.html (last visited May 6, 2018) (“Put bluntly, firearms 
started out as a tool meant to kill other living things. . . . and there is inherent danger in their misuse . . . If 
you aren’t willing to break or kill it, don’t point a gun at it.”). 
 49. Marty Hayes, Teaching Gun Safety, U.S. CONCEALED CARRY ASS’N (Feb. 1, 2010), 
https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/teaching-gun-safety/ (“Before the first shot is fired in any training 
course, gun safety must be addressed. . . . The firearms training industry operates in somewhat of a conun-
drum insomuch as we are tasked with teaching people to safely perform inherently unsafe acts[.]”). Indeed, 
NRA fire safety courses require students to sign an affidavit attesting to their knowledge that “there are 
inherent dangers and risks in the use of firearms.” E.g., NRA Home Firearm Safety Course, NIPMUC ROD & GUN 
CLUB, http://nipmucrodandgun.com/docs/newsletter/NipmucNRAHFSCourse2014.pdf (last visited May 6, 
2018). 
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as do gun safety manuals and instructors in law enforcement and the military.50 
Indeed, even when courts reject the reasonableness of a Terry stop based “solely 
on the ground that the individual possesses a gun[,]” they nonetheless recognize 
“the obvious potential danger to officers and the public by a person in possession 
of a concealed gun in a crowd[.]”51 
C. The Hand Formula and Common-Sense Risk Assessment 
Many gun rights activists will disagree with the underlying premise of the pre-
vious section that guns are inherently dangerous.52 Indeed, the contention that 
guns are inherently dangerous practically begs for the common refrain of gun rights 
activists in response—“Guns don’t kill people; people kill people.”53 But even if one 
concedes that guns are only as dangerous as the people who use them, the risk of 
guessing incorrectly remains too high to bear. The immediate destructive power of 
firearms far exceeds that of other weapons subject to a Terry frisk such as knives or 
clubs.54 This fact remains true even if one assumes that the vast majority of public 
gun possessors are lawful gun carriers and that the vast majority are responsible, 
peaceful, and generally law abiding. In other words, even if the risk of violent con-
frontation or accidental injury is low, the consequences are simply too high to pre-
vent officers from taking necessary precautions to protect themselves and the pub-
lic. 
                                                                
 50. See, e.g., DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICE TRAINING COMM’N, BASIC COURSE FIREARMS MANUAL 
(2009), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/njptc/manuals/BasicCourseFirearmsManual.pdf; OR. DEP’T OF PUB. 
SAFETY, STANDARDS & TRAINING, POLICE OFFICER FIELD TRAINING MANUAL (2013), https://www.ci.med-
ford.or.us/files/Police%20Field%20Training%20Manual%206-14-2013.pdf; U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, 5210.56, 
ARMING AND THE USE OF FORCE (2016), http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Docu-
ments/DD/issuances/dodd/521056_dodd_2016.pdf (defining “inherently dangerous property. . . . Exam-
ples include, but are not limited to: portable missiles; rockets; arms; ammunition; . . . .”). 
 51. Regalado v. State, 25 So. 3d 600, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 52. See, e.g., Firearms Are NOT Inherently Dangerous!, GUNLINK BLOG (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://blog.gunlink.info/2012/01/12/firearms-are-not-inherently-dangerous/ (noting “that you are 25 
times more likely to be injured while riding a bicycle than while hunting . . . So, next time someone makes 
the claim that firearms are inherently dangerous or that guns enable or cause crime, steer them to these 
facts.”); see also DENNIS A. HENIGAN, “GUNS DON’T KILL PEOPLE, PEOPLE KILL PEOPLE” AND OTHER MYTHS ABOUT GUNS 
AND GUN CONTROL 8–9 (2016) (describing the public statements of gun rights activists “on radio or TV talk 
shows . . . Over and over again, I would hear, ‘Guns don’t kill people. People kill people.’ I would hear, ‘When 
guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns.’”). 
 53. See HENIGAN, supra note 52, at 1; David Kyle Johnson, Guns Don’t Kill People, People Do?, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/logical-take/201302/guns-don-
t-kill-people-people-do.  
 54. For this reason, the automatic frisk position advocated herein extends only to firearms and 
not to other “weapons.” To create a blanket rule authorizing frisks upon suspicion of possession of any 
“weapon” would prove unworkable and lead to “absurd[]” results. See United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 
694, 703 (4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, J., concurring) (“To illustrate the absurdity of [a] . . . unitary meaning inter-
pretation, consider, for example, that courts have found a bottle to be a ‘weapon.’”); United States v. Daul-
ton, 488 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Courts have held that a wine bottle can be a dangerous weapon.”); 
Wright v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 1146, 1149 n.3 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Lee, 457 
A.2d 1184, 1187 (N.J. 1982)) (“A ‘weapon’ could be a brick, a baseball, bat, a hammer . . . a knitting needle, 
a sharpened pencil . . . a fork, metal pipe, a stick, etc.”).  
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This analysis ought to ring familiar to any attentive first-year law student. The 
Hand Formula, the centerpiece of first-year Torts, expresses the notion that the in-
vestment in precaution taken in any given situation should equal the product of the 
probability of harm and the magnitude of harm resulting from the injury.55 In this 
context, the frisk constitutes the precaution or burden (B) taken. This precaution is 
designed, as defined by the Court, to be a minimally invasive pat down of outer 
clothing and far less invasive a precaution than a search for evidence incident to 
arrest.56 But the Court has already routinely confirmed that a Terry frisk constitutes 
far more than a de minimis “petty indignity.”57 Any nonconsensual search by a po-
lice officer intrudes upon the “sanctity of the person,” particularly when such 
searches may be conducted on a public street, with backs turned, legs spread, and 
hands up on a wall.58 Thus, to justify this “precaution” for Hand Formula purposes, 
an officer must demonstrate that the product of the probability of harm and mag-
nitude of harm is significant. 
The probability of harm (P) reflects the likelihood that the firearm will be dis-
charged and injure the officer or nearby members of the public, either by the armed 
individual or someone else, either deliberately or accidentally. While gun rights ac-
tivists focus on the law-abiding nature of concealed carriers to argue that these in-
dividuals pose little risk of violently attacking others, this focuses on only one risk 
created by public concealed carry. The officer must also account for the possibility 
that the armed individual will accidentally discharge his weapon or that someone 
else in the nearby vicinity will gain possession of the firearm and use it, either de-
liberately or accidentally. The presence of other individuals is relevant as well. 
When the officer and the armed individual are the only two persons within range, 
                                                                
 55. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the probability [of 
an accident] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions] B; liability depends upon 
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [<] PL.”); see also Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining 
Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 
816–25 (2001) (discussing the contours and limits of the Hand Formula and related risk-assessment metrics). 
 56. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968); cf. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 713 (4th Cir. 
2017) (Harris, J., dissenting) (“[T]he frisk itself, euphemistically described as a ‘pat-down’ . . . may extend to 
a thorough touching of sensitive and private areas of the body.”); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 
381–82 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting J. MOYNAHAN, POLICE SEARCHING PROCEDURES 
7 (1963) (“I frankly doubt, moreover, whether the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amend-
ment would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, 
to such indignity—which is described as follows in a police manual: ‘Check the subject’s neck and collar. A 
check should be made under the subject’s arm. Next a check should be made of the upper back. The lower 
back should also be checked. ‘A check should be made of the upper part of the man’s chest and the lower 
region around the stomach. The belt, a favorite concealment spot, should be checked. The inside thigh and 
crotch area also should be searched. The legs should be checked for possible weapons. The last items to be 
checked are the shoes and cuffs of the subject.’”). 
 57. Terry, 392 U.S. at 1617 (“[I]t is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in 
public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a ‘petty 
indignity.’ It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and 
arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.”). 
 58. Id. at 17. 
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the risk of injury to others is lower than if the stop occurs in a crowd.59 At a mini-
mum, the presence of a firearm creates a non-zero risk of harm. 
But even if one concedes that concealed-gun carriers represent a compara-
tively low risk of harm to the officer or the nearby public, the magnitude of harm 
from the discharge of a firearm (M) is so significant that the Hand Formula none-
theless justifies the precaution of a frisk. “The United States experiences epidemic 
levels of gun violence, claiming over 30,000 lives annually, according to the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. For every person who dies from a gun-
shot wound, two others are wounded. Every year, approximately 100,000 Ameri-
cans are victims of gun violence.”60 Firearms were “the third-leading cause of injury-
related deaths . . . in 2010, following poisoning and motor vehicle accidents.”61 
Moreover, regions and states with more permissive concealed carry laws and higher 
rates of gun ownership have significantly higher rates of homicide that states with 
lower rates of gun ownership.62  
People of all age groups are significantly more likely to die from uninten-
tional firearm injuries when they live in states with more guns, relative to 
states with fewer guns. On average, states with the highest gun levels had 
nine times the rate of unintentional firearms deaths compared to states 
with the lowest gun levels.63  
And, the American Journal of Public Health found that police officers are signifi-
cantly more likely to be killed by a civilian firearm in the line of duty in states with 
higher gun levels than states with lower gun levels.64 In short, the potentially cata-
strophic cost of guessing wrong justifies an automatic frisk in the presence of a fire-
arm, even when the risk is low.65 
But even if one can justify an automatic frisk for firearms during a Terry stop, 
the question remains whether the officer should be allowed to physically disarm 
the individual. “Weapons seizures are not an explicit part of the Terry framework, 
but a necessary implication of the case is that guns can be seized, at least tempo-
rarily, . . . if the firearm makes the person ‘presently dangerous.’”66 Although the 
                                                                
 59. See United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding frisk of armed 
individual, in part because “the mall was crowded and at a minimum, [the officer] needed to see that the 
gun was removed from the premises without endangering his safety or the safety of the mall patrons.”). 
 60. Statistics, GIFFORDS L. CTR., http://lawcenter.giffords.org/facts/statistics/ (last visited May 6, 
2018). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Matthew Miller et al., Rates of Household Firearm Ownership and Homicide Across US Re-
gions and States, 1988–1997, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1988, 1991 (2002). 
 63. GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 60. 
 64. German Lopez, America’s Unique Gun Violence Problem, Explained in 17 Maps and Charts, 
VOX (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/2/16399418/us-gun-violence-sta-
tistics-maps-charts.  
 65. See Schubert v. City of Springfield, 589 F.3d 496, 499–502 (“[The officer] observed Schubert 
walking toward the Springfield courthouse carrying a gun. . . . [The court] need not outline in detail the 
obvious and potentially horrific events that could have transpired had an officer noted a man walking to-
ward the courthouse with a gun and chosen not to intervene.”).  
 66. Bellin, supra note 4, at 30–31 (citing United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
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past assumption “that a person carrying a concealed weapon was engaged in the 
crime of unlawful weapons possession” no longer suffices to disarm an individual 
“with little analysis,” a recognition of the inherent dangerousness of guns should 
allow for an automatic temporary disarming of the individual during a lawful stop.67 
Indeed, “[c]ourts may agree that the inherent dangers of firearms make this show-
ing essentially automatic whenever officers encounter armed persons in public.”68 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The probability analysis underlying Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard de-
pends on an officer’s practical understanding of the world around her. In the hand-
guns context, that world is rapidly changing. The number of private firearms in this 
country now exceeds the number of people physically present in the country.69 All 
fifty states and the District of Columbia authorize public concealed carry of these 
firearms by civilians.70 Forty-two of these states impose little or no restrictions on 
who can carry these weapons or where they can carry them.71 This changing land-
scape poses obvious and significant challenges for police officers, who have tradi-
tionally initiated lawful stops and frisks of publicly armed individuals on the assump-
tion that a crime was being committed by a dangerous person. That assumption 
seems increasingly unreliable. 
In the absence of justifiable bright-line presumptions, traditional tort law risk 
assessment principles may offer a framework for analyzing Terry’s two-pronged test 
in the concealed carry context. The Hand Formula’s sublimely simple articulation of 
due care requirements in a given circumstance provides one such framework (but 
certainly not the only one). By applying that well-worn algebraic expression in the 
Fourth Amendment stop and frisk context, it would appear, at least preliminarily, 
that a balance of burden sharing ought to be struck between the suspicious officer 
and the publicly-armed suspect. But in the realm of probabilities and uncertain-
ties—both in tort law and constitutional law—these preliminary conclusions require 
constant reassessment, reconsideration, and reexamination. Hopefully, this Essay 
has helped inform that dialogue moving forward. 
                                                                
 67. Id. at 31. 
 68. Id.; see also United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 705 (4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the dangers that lawful firearms pose and recognized by courts). 
 69. Christopher Ingraham, There Are Now More Guns Than People in the United States, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/05/guns-in-the-united-
states-one-for-every-man-woman-and-child-and-then-some/?utm_term=.7fa1031d06f1. 
 70. GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 5. 
 71. Id.  
